The GDPR
Article 44 is intended to state the general principle governing data transfers to non-EU third countries or international organizations. These transfers can only be effected if the controllers and the processors falling under the scope of the Regulation comply with the rules provided in Chapter V.
The provision gives however a new extension to the rule: transfers of personal data to a third country or to an international organization operated as part of planned or ongoing processing are covered, but also the future processing by the recipient third country to another country or another organization. They must also comply with Chapter V of the Regulation. In other words, by this provision, the Regulation sets up a sort of data protection-specific “right to pursue”: the data transferred outside the Union remain subject to the law of the Union not only for their transfer, but also for any processing and subsequent transfer.
The concept of international organization, defined in article 4, 26) of the Regulation is an organization and its subordinate bodies governed by public international law, or any other body which is set up by, or on the basis of, an agreement between two or more countries.
This provision has been reintroduced by the final version of the Regulation, after having been removed from the second proposed version. The goal, as referred to in the provision is that the level of protection of individuals guaranteed by the Regulations is not lowered.
The Directive
The Directive included no similar provision.
Potential issues
The extension of the territorial scope to processing carried out outside the territory of the Union, by recipient controllers and processors established outside the EU has both political and legal implications.
Politically, the provision allows the European authorities to intervene and detect violations of the Regulation outside the EU on the grounds of a new legitimacy included in the Regulation. It can more easily use the argument of the data protection in different files or negotiations in order to obtain an advantage.
Legally, it goes without saying that the provision may be felt by third countries as an attack on their sovereignty because it imposes a new rule on their territory and a limitation of the freedom of processing. The powers of control and enforcement of the EU authorities and the Member States, of course, cannot be exercised outside the territory of the EU.
The measure must be taken of the difference with other rules allowing the application of the Regulation to controllers established outside the territory of the EU (see Article 3). It is an indirect submission since only the controllers and the processors who are subject to the other provisions of the Regulation pursuant to Article 3, must comply with Article 44 and accordingly, Chapter V. There is no recipient of the transferred data. Or any person concerned by the data which would be at the origin of the transfer either.
CJEU caselaw
C-311/18 (16 July 2020)
1. Article 2(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), must be interpreted as meaning that that regulation applies to the transfer of personal data for commercial purposes by an economic operator established in a Member State to another economic operator established in a third country, irrespective of whether, at the time of that transfer or thereafter, that data is liable to be processed by the authorities of the third country in question for the purposes of public security, defence and State security.
2. Article 46(1) and Article 46(2)(c) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that the appropriate safeguards, enforceable rights and effective legal remedies required by those provisions must ensure that data subjects whose personal data are transferred to a third country pursuant to standard data protection clauses are afforded a level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union by that regulation, read in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. To that end, the assessment of the level of protection afforded in the context of such a transfer must, in particular, take into consideration both the contractual clauses agreed between the controller or processor established in the European Union and the recipient of the transfer established in the third country concerned and, as regards any access by the public authorities of that third country to the personal data transferred, the relevant aspects of the legal system of that third country, in particular those set out, in a non-exhaustive manner, in Article 45(2) of that regulation.
3. Article 58(2)(f) and (j) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that, unless there is a valid European Commission adequacy decision, the competent supervisory authority is required to suspend or prohibit a transfer of data to a third country pursuant to standard data protection clauses adopted by the Commission, if, in the view of that supervisory authority and in the light of all the circumstances of that transfer, those clauses are not or cannot be complied with in that third country and the protection of the data transferred that is required by EU law, in particular by Articles 45 and 46 of that regulation and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, cannot be ensured by other means, where the controller or a processor has not itself suspended or put an end to the transfer.
4. Examination of Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, as amended by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2297 of 16 December 2016 in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has disclosed nothing to affect the validity of that decision.
5. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield is invalid.
Opinion of Advocate general
Judgment of the Court
