The GDPR
Article 79 gives people affected by processing, a genuine right to an effective judicial remedy against both the controller and the processor in case of infringement of their rights resulting from the processing of their data. This right is not to be confused either with the possibility of lodging a complaint with a supervisory authority referred to in article 78, nor with any other administrative or extra-judicial remedy provided under the relevant national law.
The second paragraph allows the data subject to bring his action either before the courts of the Member State in which the controller has an establishment or in the courts of the state of habitual residence of the data subject, unless controller or processor is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers.
It should be noted that as per recital 146, the jurisdictional rules contained in the Regulation need subject to the general jurisdictional rules contained in other legal instruments, such as those contained in Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 concerning jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions on civil and commercial matters (Regulation called Brussels I bis).
The Directive
The Directive Article 22 requires the Member States to provide to any person the right to a judicial remedy in case of breach of the rights guaranteed to him by the national provisions transposing the Directive.
Potential issues
The competence of the courts will not necessarily imply that they must apply their national laws that codify the Regulation or that the national authority of the state court is competent.
European Union
CJEU caselaw
C-40/17 (29 July 2019) - Fashion ID
1. Articles 22 to 24 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which allows consumer-protection associations to bring or defend legal proceedings against a person allegedly responsible for an infringement of the protection of personal data.
2. The operator of a website, such as Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG, that embeds on that website a social plugin causing the browser of a visitor to that website to request content from the provider of that plugin and, to that end, to transmit to that provider personal data of the visitor can be considered to be a controller, within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46. That liability is, however, limited to the operation or set of operations involving the processing of personal data in respect of which it actually determines the purposes and means, that is to say, the collection and disclosure by transmission of the data at issue.
3. In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which the operator of a website embeds on that website a social plugin causing the browser of a visitor to that website to request content from the provider of that plugin and, to that end, to transmit to that provider personal data of the visitor, it is necessary that that operator and that provider each pursue a legitimate interest, within the meaning of Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46, through those processing operations in order for those operations to be justified in respect of each of them.
4. Article 2(h) and Article 7(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which the operator of a website embeds on that website a social plugin causing the browser of a visitor to that website to request content from the provider of that plugin and, to that end, to transmit to that provider personal data of the visitor, the consent referred to in those provisions must be obtained by that operator only with regard to the operation or set of operations involving the processing of personal data in respect of which that operator determines the purposes and means. In addition, Article 10 of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that, in such a situation, the duty to inform laid down in that provision is incumbent also on that operator, but the information that the latter must provide to the data subject need relate only to the operation or set of operations involving the processing of personal data in respect of which that operator actually determines the purposes and means.
Judgment of the Court
Opinion of the Advocate General
C‑132/21 (12 January 2023), Budapesti Elektromos Művek
Article 77(1), Article 78(1) and Article 79(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
must be interpreted as permitting the remedies provided for in Article 77(1) and Article 78(1) of that regulation, on the one hand, and Article 79(1) thereof, on the other, to be exercised concurrently with and independently of each other. It is for the Member States, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to lay down detailed rules as regards the relationship between those remedies in order to ensure the effective protection of the rights guaranteed by that regulation and the consistent and homogeneous application of its provisions, as well as the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal as referred to in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Decision of the court
Opinion of the advocate General
C-313/23 (30 April 2025) - Inspektorat kam Visshia sadeben savet
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:
1. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence precludes a Member State’s practice under which the members of a judicial body of that Member State – who are elected by its parliament for terms of office of a specific duration and are competent to scrutinise the activity of judges, public prosecutors and investigating magistrates in the performance of their functions, to carry out checks in respect of their integrity and the absence of conflicts of interest on their part, as well as to propose to another judicial body the initiation of disciplinary proceedings with a view to the imposition of disciplinary penalties on those persons – continue to perform their functions beyond the legal duration of their terms of office as laid down in the Constitution of that Member State, until that parliament elects new members, where the extension of the expired terms of office does not have an express legal basis in national law containing clear and precise rules such as to circumscribe the performance of those functions and where it is not guaranteed that that extension is, in practice, limited in time.
2. Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
must be interpreted as meaning that disclosure, to a judicial body, of personal data that are protected by banking secrecy and that concern judges, public prosecutors and investigating magistrates as well as their family members, with a view to the verification of the declarations which are submitted by those judges, public prosecutors and investigating magistrates concerning their assets and those of their family members and which are published, constitutes processing of personal data that comes within the material scope of that regulation.
3. Article 4(7) of Regulation 2016/679
must be interpreted as meaning that a court having jurisdiction to authorise, at the request of another judicial body, disclosure by a bank to that body of data relating to the bank accounts of judges, public prosecutors and investigating magistrates as well as of their family members, cannot be classified as a controller within the meaning of that provision.
4. Article 51 of Regulation 2016/679
must be interpreted as meaning that a court having jurisdiction to authorise disclosure of personal data to another judicial body does not constitute a supervisory authority within the meaning of that article, where that court is not entrusted by the Member State in which it is situated with monitoring the application of that regulation in order to protect, in particular, the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to the processing of their personal data.
5. Article 79(1) of Regulation 2016/679, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
must be interpreted as meaning that a court having jurisdiction to authorise disclosure of personal data to another judicial body is not required, where an action pursuant to that provision has not been brought before it, to ensure of its own motion the protection of the persons whose data are concerned as regards compliance with the provisions of that regulation relating to the security of personal data, including where it is known that that body has, in the past, infringed those provisions.
Opinion of the Advocate General
Judgment of the Court
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