The GDPR

Warning: the definitions of Article 4 are commented in the provision of the Regulation that appeared most clarifying to its content. Other provisions use the concepts defined in this article. They can be identified by inserting the concept as a keyword.

1. personal data (see Article 2).

(3) processing (see Article 2).

 (3a) restriction of processing (see Article 18).

(3aa) profiling (see Article 22).

(3b) pseudonymisation (see Article 25).

(4) filing system (see Article 2).

(5) controller (see Article 3).

(6) processor (see Article 28).

(7) recipient (see Article 13).

(7a) third party (see Article 6).

(8) data subject’s consent (see Article 7).

(9) personal data breach (see Article 33).

(10) genetic data (see Article 9).

(11) biometric data (see Article 9).

(12) data concerning health (see Article 9).

(13) main establishment of the controller (see Article 56).

(14) representative (see Article 27).

(15) enterprise (see Article 47).

(16) group of undertakings (see Article 47).

(17) binding corporate rules (see Article 47).

(19) supervising authority (see Article 51).

(19a) supervising authority concerned (see Article 60).

(19b) cross-border processing (see Article 56).

(19c) relevant and reasoned objection (see Article 60).

(20) information society service (see Article 8).

(21) international organization (see Article 44).

The Directive

Definitions

Potential issues

No specific provision

European Union

Retour au sommaire

Article 29 Working Party

Guidelines for identifying a controller or processor’s lead supervisory authority (5 April 2017)

(Endorsed by the EDPB)

Identifying a lead supervisory authority is only relevant where a controller or processor is carrying out the cross-border processing of personal data. Article 4(23) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) defines ‘cross-border processing’ as either the:

- processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of establishments in more than one Member State of a controller or processor in the Union where the controller or processor is established in more than one Member State; or the

- processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of a single establishment of a controller or processor in the Union but which substantially affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in more than one Member State.

This means that where an organisation has establishments in France and Romania, for example, and the processing of personal data takes place in the context of their activities, then this will constitute cross-border processing.

Alternatively, the organisation may only carry out processing activity in the context of its establishment in France. However, if the activity substantially affects – or is likely to substantially affect - data subjects in France and Romania then this will also constitute crossborder processing.

Link

Guidelines on Personal data breach notification under Regulation 2016/679 (6 February 2018)

(Endorsed by the EDPB)

The General Data Protection Regulation (the GDPR) introduces the requirement for a personal data breach (henceforth “breach”) to be notified to the competent national supervisory authority (or in the case of a cross-border breach, to the lead authority) and, in certain cases, to communicate the breach to the individuals whose personal data have been affected by the breach.

Obligations to notify in cases of breaches presently exist for certain organisations, such as providers of publicly-available electronic communications services (as specified in Directive 2009/136/EC and Regulation (EU) No 611/2013). There are also some EU Member States that already have their own national breach notification obligation. This may include the obligation to notify breaches involving categories of controllers in addition to providers of publicly available electronic communication services (for example in Germany and Italy), or an obligation to report all breaches involving personal data (such as in the Netherlands). Other Member States may have relevant Codes of Practice (for example, in Ireland). Whilst a number of EU data protection authorities currently encourage controllers to report breaches, the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which the GDPR replaces, does not contain a specific breach notification obligation and therefore such a requirement will be new for many organisations. The GDPR now makes notification mandatory for all controllers unless a breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals. Processors also have an important role to play and they must notify any breach to their controller.

The Article 29 Working Party (WP29) considers that the new notification requirement has a number of benefits. When notifying the supervisory authority, controllers can obtain advice on whether the affected individuals need to be informed. Indeed, the supervisory authority may order the controller to inform those individuals about the breach7. Communicating a breach to individuals allows the controller to provide information on the risks presented as a result of the breach and the steps those individuals can take to protect themselves from its potential consequences. The focus of any breach response plan should be on protecting individuals and their personal data. Consequently, breach notification should be seen as a tool enhancing compliance in relation to the protection of personal data. At the same time, it should be noted that failure to report a breach to either an individual or a supervisory authority may mean that under Article 83 a possible sanction is applicable to the controller.

Controllers and processors are therefore encouraged to plan in advance and put in place processes to be able to detect and promptly contain a breach, to assess the risk to individuals8, and then to determine whether it is necessary to notify the competent supervisory authority, and to communicate the breach to the individuals concerned when necessary. Notification to the supervisory authority should form a part of that incident response plan.

The GDPR contains provisions on when a breach needs to be notified, and to whom, as well as what information should be provided as part of the notification. Information required for the notification can be provided in phases, but in any event controllers should act on any breach in a timely manner.

In its Opinion 03/2014 on personal data breach notification9, WP29 provided guidance to controllers in order to help them to decide whether to notify data subjects in case of a breach. The opinion considered the obligation of providers of electronic communications regarding Directive 2002/58/EC and provided examples from multiple sectors, in the context of the then draft GDPR, and presented good practices for all controllers.

The current Guidelines explain the mandatory breach notification and communication requirements of the GDPR and some of the steps controllers and processors can take to meet these new obligations. They also give examples of various types of breaches and who would need to be notified in different scenarios.

Link

Retour au sommaire

European Union

CJEU caselaw

C-101/01 (6 November 2003) - Bodil Lindqvist

1.    The act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons and identifying them by name or by other means, for instance by giving their telephone number or information regarding their working conditions and hobbies, constitutes the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

2.    Such processing of personal data is not covered by any of the exceptions in Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46.

3.    Reference to the fact that an individual has injured her foot and is on half-time on medical grounds constitutes personal data concerning health within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Directive 95/46.

4.    There is no transfer [of data] to a third country within the meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State loads personal data onto an internet page which is stored on an internet site on which the page can be consulted and which is hosted by a natural or legal person who is established in that State or in another Member State, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who connects to the internet, including people in a third country.

5.    The provisions of Directive 95/46 do not, in themselves, bring about a restriction which conflicts with the general principles of freedom of expression or other freedoms and rights, which are applicable within the European Union and are enshrined inter alia in Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950. It is for the national authorities and courts responsible for applying the national legislation implementing Directive 95/46 to ensure a fair balance between the rights and interests in question, including the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order.

6.    Measures taken by the Member States to ensure the protection of personal data must be consistent both with the provisions of Directive 95/46 and with its objective of maintaining a balance between freedom of movement of personal data and the protection of private life. However, nothing prevents a Member State from extending the scope of the national legislation implementing the provisions of Directive 95/46 to areas not included in the scope thereof provided that no other provision of Community law precludes it.

Link

C-342/12 (30 May 2013) - Worten

1.      Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data is to be interpreted as meaning that a record of working time, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which indicates, in relation to each worker, the times when working hours begin and end, as well as the corresponding breaks and intervals, is included within the concept of ‘personal data’, within the meaning of that provision.

2.      Article 6(1)(b) and (c) and Article 7(c) and (e) of Directive 95/46 do not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires an employer to make the record of working time available to the national authority responsible for monitoring working conditions so as to allow its immediate consultation, provided that this obligation is necessary for the purposes of the performance by that authority of its task of monitoring the application of the legislation relating to working conditions, in particular as regards working time.

Judgment of the Court 

C-131/12 (13 May 2014) - Google Spain et Google

1.      Article 2(b) and (d) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data are to be interpreted as meaning that, first, the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of preference must be classified as ‘processing of personal data’ within the meaning of Article 2(b) when that information contains personal data and, second, the operator of the search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect of that processing, within the meaning of Article 2(d).

2.      Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that processing of personal data is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of a Member State, within the meaning of that provision, when the operator of a search engine sets up in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell advertising space offered by that engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member State.

3.      Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to comply with the rights laid down in those provisions and in so far as the conditions laid down by those provisions are in fact satisfied, the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to that person, also in a case where that name or information is not erased beforehand or simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as the case may be, when its publication in itself on those pages is lawful.

4.      Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, when appraising the conditions for the application of those provisions, it should inter alia be examined whether the data subject has a right that the information in question relating to him personally should, at this point in time, no longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of his name, without it being necessary in order to find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in that list causes prejudice to the data subject. As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.

Opinion of Advocate general

Judgment of the Court

C-683/13 (19 June 2014) - Pharmacontinente - Saúde e Higiene e.a.

1.     Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data is to be interpreted as meaning that a record of working time, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which indicates, in relation to each worker, the times when working hours begin and end, as well as the corresponding breaks and intervals, is covered by the concept of ‘personal data’ as referred to in that provision.

2.    Article 6(1)(b) and (c) and Article 7(c) and (e) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires an employer to make the record of working time available to the national authority responsible for monitoring working conditions so as to allow its immediate consultation, provided that this obligation is necessary for the purposes of the performance by that authority of its task of monitoring the application of the legislation relating to working conditions, in particular as regards working time.

3.    It is for the referring court to determine whether the employer’s obligation to provide the national authority responsible for monitoring working conditions access to the record of working time so as to allow its immediate consultation may be considered necessary for the purposes of the performance by that authority of its monitoring task, by contributing to the more effective application of the legislation relating to working conditions, in particular as regards working time, and, if so, whether the penalties imposed with a view to ensuring the effective application of the requirements laid down by Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003, concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, are consistent with the principle of proportionality.

Judgment of the Court

C-434/16 ( 20 December 2017) - Nowak

Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, the written answers submitted by a candidate at a professional examination and any comments made by an examiner with respect to those answers constitute personal data, within the meaning of that provision.

Opinion of advocate general

Judgment of the court

C-210/16 (5 June 2018) - Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein

Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘controller’ within the meaning of that provision encompasses the administrator of a fan page hosted on a social network.

Opinion of Advocate general

Judgment of court

C-25/17 (10 July 2018) - Jehovan todistajat

 1.  Article 2(c) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of a ‘filing system’, referred to by that provision, covers a set of personal data collected in the course of door-to-door preaching, consisting of the names and addresses and other information concerning the persons contacted, if those data are structured according to specific criteria which, in practice, enable them to be easily retrieved for subsequent use. In order for such a set of data to fall within that concept, it is not necessary that they include data sheets, specific lists or other search methods.

2.  Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46, read in the light of Article 10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as meaning that it supports the finding that a religious community is a controller, jointly with its members who engage in preaching, for the processing of personal data carried out by the latter in the context of door-to-door preaching organised, coordinated and encouraged by that community, without it being necessary that the community has access to those data, or to establish that that community has given its members written guidelines or instructions in relation to the data processing.

Opinion of Advocate general 

Judgment of the court

C-345/17 (14 février 2019) - Buivids

1.      Article 3 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the recording of a video of police officers in a police station, while a statement is being made, and the publication of that video on a video website, on which users can send, watch and share videos, are matters which come within the scope of that directive.

2.      Article 9 of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that factual circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, that is to say, the video recording of police officers in a police station, while a statement is being made, and the publication of that recorded video on a video website, on which users can send, watch and share videos, may constitute a processing of personal data solely for journalistic purposes, within the meaning of that provision, in so far as it is apparent from that video that the sole object of that recording and publication thereof is the disclosure of information, opinions or ideas to the public, this being a matter which it is for the referring court to determine.

Link

C-272/19 (9 July 2020) - VQ v. Land Hessen

Article 4(7) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) must be interpreted as meaning that, in so far as a Petitions Committee of the parliament of a Federated State of a Member State determines, alone or with others, the purposes and means of the processing of personal data, that committee must be categorised as a ‘controller’, within the meaning of that provision, and consequently the processing of personal data carried out by that committee falls within the scope of that regulation and, in particular, of Article 15 thereof.

Judgment of the court

C-61/19 (11 November 2020) - Orange Romania SA

Article 2(h) and Article 7(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and Article 4(11) and Article 6(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), must be interpreted as meaning that it is for the data controller to demonstrate that the data subject has, by active behaviour, given his or her consent to the processing of his or her personal data and that he or she has obtained, beforehand, information relating to all the circumstances surrounding that processing, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, allowing that person easily to understand the consequences of that consent, so that it is given with full knowledge of the facts. A contract for the provision of telecommunications services which contains a clause stating that the data subject has been informed of, and has consented to, the collection and storage of a copy of his or her identity document for identification purposes is not such as to demonstrate that that person has validly given his or her consent, as provided for in those provisions, to that collection and storage, where

• the box referring to that clause has been ticked by the data controller before the contract was signed, or where;
• the terms of that contract are capable of misleading the data subject as to the possibility of concluding the contract in question even if he or she refuses to consent to the processing of his or her data, or where;
• the freedom to choose to object to that collection and storage is unduly affected by that controller, in requiring that the data subject, in order to refuse consent, must complete an additional form setting out that refusal.

Judgment of the court

C-659/22, RK. V. Ministerstvo Zdravotnictvi, (5 October 2023)

The concept of ‘processing’ personal data referred to in Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)

must be interpreted as including the verification, using a national mobile application, of the validity of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates issued pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2021 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) to facilitate free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic, and used by a Member State for national purposes.

Judgment of the court

C-683/21, Nacionalinis visuomenės sveikatos centras prie Sveikatos apsaugos ministerijos v. Valstybinė duomenų apsaugos inspekcija, (5 Décember 2023)

1.      Article 4(7) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),

must be interpreted as meaning that an entity which has entrusted an undertaking with the development of a mobile IT application and which has, in that context, participated in the determination of the purposes and means of the processing of personal data carried out through that application may be regarded as a controller, within the meaning of that provision, even if that entity has not itself performed any processing operations in respect of such data, has not expressly agreed to the performance of specific operations for such processing or to that mobile application being made available to the public, and has not acquired the abovementioned mobile application, unless, prior to that application being made available to the public, that entity expressly objected to such making available and to the resulting processing of personal data.

2.      Article 4(7) and Article 26(1) of Regulation 2016/679

must be interpreted as meaning that the classification of two entities as joint controllers does not require that there be an arrangement between those entities regarding the determination of the purposes and means of the processing of personal data in question; nor does it require that there be an arrangement laying down the terms of the joint control.

3.      Article 4(2) of Regulation 2016/679

must be interpreted as meaning that the use of personal data for the purposes of the IT testing of a mobile application constitutes ‘processing’, within the meaning of that provision, unless such data have been rendered anonymous in such a manner that the subject of those data is not or is no longer identifiable, or unless it involves fictitious data which do not relate to an existing natural person.

4.      Article 83 of Regulation 2016/679

must be interpreted as meaning that (i) an administrative fine may be imposed pursuant to that provision only where it is established that the controller has intentionally or negligently committed an infringement referred to in paragraphs 4 to 6 of that article, and (ii) such a fine may be imposed on a controller in respect of personal data processing operations performed by a processor on behalf of that controller, unless, in the context of those operations, that processor has carried out processing for its own purposes or has processed such data in a manner incompatible with the framework of, or detailed arrangements for, the processing as determined by the controller, or in such a manner that it cannot reasonably be considered that that controller consented to such processing.

 

Opinion of Advocate general 

Judgment of the court

 

C‑231/22, État belge contre Autorité de protection des données (11 janvier 2024​)

1.      Point 7 of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),

must be interpreted as meaning that the agency or body responsible for the official journal of a Member State, which is inter alia required, under the law of that State, to publish as they stand official acts and documents that have been prepared by third parties under their own responsibility in compliance with the applicable rules, then lodged with a judicial authority that sends them to it for publication, may, notwithstanding its lack of legal personality, be classified as a ‘controller’ of the personal data contained in those acts and documents, where the national law concerned determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data performed by that official journal.

2.      Article 5(2) of Regulation 2016/679, read in conjunction with point 7 of Article 4 and Article 26(1) thereof,

must be interpreted as meaning that the agency or body responsible for the official journal of a Member State, classified as a ‘controller’ within the meaning of point 7 of Article 4 of that regulation, is solely responsible for compliance with the principles set out in Article 5(1) thereof as regards the personal data processing operations that it is required to perform under national law, unless joint responsibility with other entities in respect of those operations arises under that law.

Décision of the Court

Opinion of Advocate General

Retour au sommaire Retour au sommaire