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Article 21
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Right to object

Official
Texts Guidelines Caselaw Review of
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Nat. Regulation
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Articles related to article 21

Key words related to article 21

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(65) A data subject should have the right to have personal data concerning him or her rectified and a ‘right to be forgotten’ where the retention of such data infringes this Regulation or Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject. In particular, a data subject should have the right to have his or her personal data erased and no longer processed where the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are collected or otherwise processed, where a data subject has withdrawn his or her consent or objects to the processing of personal data concerning him or her, or where the processing of his or her personal data does not otherwise comply with this Regulation. That right is relevant in particular where the data subject has given his or her consent as a child and is not fully aware of the risks involved by the processing, and later wants to remove such personal data, especially on the internet. The data subject should be able to exercise that right notwithstanding the fact that he or she is no longer a child. However, the further retention of the personal data should be lawful where it is necessary, for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information, for compliance with a legal obligation, for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, on the grounds of public interest in the area of public health, for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.

(69) Where personal data might lawfully be processed because processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, or on grounds of the legitimate interests of a controller or a third party, a data subject should, nevertheless, be entitled to object to the processing of any personal data relating to his or her particular situation. It should be for the controller to demonstrate that its compelling legitimate interest overrides the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.

(70) Where personal data are processed for the purposes of direct marketing, the data subject should have the right to object to such processing, including profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing, whether with regard to initial or further processing, at any time and free of charge. That right should be explicitly brought to the attention of the data subject and presented clearly and separately from any other information.

(73) Restrictions concerning specific principles and the rights of information, access to and rectification or erasure of personal data, the right to data portability, the right to object, decisions based on profiling, as well as the communication of a personal data breach to a data subject and certain related obligations of the controllers may be imposed by Union or Member State law, as far as necessary and proportionate in a democratic society to safeguard public security, including the protection of human life especially in response to natural or manmade disasters, the prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security, or of breaches of ethics for regulated professions, other important objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a Member State, in particular an important economic or financial interest of the Union or of a Member State, the keeping of public registers kept for reasons of general public interest, further processing of archived personal data to provide specific information related to the political behaviour under former totalitarian state regimes or the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others, including social protection, public health and humanitarian purposes. Those restrictions should be in accordance with the requirements set out in the Charter and in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

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(25) Whereas the principles of protection must be reflected, on the one hand, in the obligations imposed on persons, public authorities, enterprises, agencies or other bodies responsible for processing, in particular regarding data quality, technical security, notification to the supervisory authority, and the circumstances under which processing can be carried out, and, on the other hand, in the right conferred on individuals, the data on whom are the subject of processing, to be informed that processing is taking place, to consult the data, to request corrections and even to object to processing in certain circumstances;

The GDPR

According to Article 21 of the Regulation, the right to object may be exercised on grounds relating to the data subject’s particular situation and for processing based on:

- Article 6 (1), e), i.e., “the processing is necessary to the performance of a task in the public interest or in the exercise of the official authority vested in the controller”;

- Article 6 (1), f), i.e., when the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.

It should be noted in extremis that these assumptions included the profiling done on these grounds.

In other words, the right to object, as it was initially provided for in the Directive, can be invoked in both cases of lawfulness of processing covered and not, for example, when the processing is based on the data subject’s consent. While the Directive to the Member States provides at least the application of the right to object in these two cases of processing, the Regulation seems opposed to the extension of the scope of the right to object any further, as provided for in some national laws under the Directive.

This restriction seems to be partially compensated by the possibility to withdraw the consent to processing at any time, which will require the controller to refuse to continue the processing, knowing that the withdrawal of consent does not question the lawfulness of the processing prior to the withdrawal (Art. 7 (3)).

Furthermore, the controller may refuse to implement the right to object of the data subject when establishing the existence of compelling and legitimate grounds justifying the processing, which take priority over the data subject’s interests or rights and freedoms, or for the recognition, exercise or defence of a legal right.

The Regulation also provides that the data subject may object at any time the processing of their personal data for marketing purposes, including profiling done for this purpose (Art. 21 § 2). 

The existence of these rights to object must be brought to the knowledge of the data subject, clearly and separately from any other information, at the time of the first communication with the data subject at the latest. The notification can be made by automated means as part of an offer of the use of an information society service and notwithstanding the Directive 2002/58/EC.

Finally, the controller may refuse to proceed with the right to object of the data subject when the data are processed for historical, statistical or scientific purposes in the meaning of Article 89, if he or she can demonstrate that the processing is necessary for the performance of a task of public interest.

The Directive

The right to object by the person concerned by a processing of personal data was already provided by Article 14 of the Directive. Such right allowed any person to object to the processing of his or her data, by referring to "compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation", at least when the processing was necessary for the performance of a public controller (Article 7 (e)) or when the processing was based on the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed (Article 7 (f)). In addition, this right allowed anyone to object to the processing of his data for marketing purposes, regardless of the basis for processing.

Potential issues

According to the Belgian Commission for the Protection of Privacy in its opinion 10/2014 of 5 February 2014, the wording of Article 21 of the second draft Regulation led to the "unacceptable risk of the controllers continuously invoking their legitimate interest in order to object to the right to object exercised by the subject data".

It is doubtlessly true that the ability left to the controller to refuse to comply with the right to object of the data subject entrusting him the task to make a balance between its legitimate interests and those of the data subject will not be easy to exercise. The data subject has however more effective remedies in case of unjustified refusal and the controller is also at risk receiving sanctions from the supervisory authority.

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Summary

European Union

European Union

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Article 29 Working Party

Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 - wp251rev.01 (6 February 2018)

(Endorsed by the EDPB)

The General Data Protection Regulation (the GDPR), specifically addresses profiling and automated individual decision-making, including profiling.

Profiling and automated decision-making are used in an increasing number of sectors, both private and public. Banking and finance, healthcare, taxation, insurance, marketing and advertising are just a few examples of the fields where profiling is being carried out more regularly to aid decision-making.

Advances in technology and the capabilities of big data analytics, artificial intelligence and machine learning have made it easier to create profiles and make automated decisions with the potential to significantly impact individuals’ rights and freedoms.

The widespread availability of personal data on the internet and from Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and the ability to find correlations and create links, can allow aspects of an individual’s personality or behaviour, interests and habits to be determined, analysed and predicted.

Profiling and automated decision-making can be useful for individuals and organisations, delivering benefits such as:

  • increased efficiencies; and
  • resource savings.

They have many commercial applications, for example, they can be used to better segment markets and tailor services and products to align with individual needs. Medicine, education, healthcare and transportation can also all benefit from these processes.

However, profiling and automated decision-making can pose significant risks for individuals’ rights and freedoms which require appropriate safeguards.

These processes can be opaque. Individuals might not know that they are being profiled or understand what is involved.

Profiling can perpetuate existing stereotypes and social segregation. It can also lock a person into a specific category and restrict them to their suggested preferences. This can undermine their freedom to choose, for example, certain products or services such as books, music or newsfeeds. In some cases, profiling can lead to inaccurate predictions. In other cases it can lead to denial of services and goods and unjustified discrimination.

The GDPR introduces new provisions to address the risks arising from profiling and automated decision-making, notably, but not limited to, privacy. The purpose of these guidelines is to clarify those provisions.

This document covers:

  • Definitions of profiling and automated decision-making and the GDPR approach to these in general – Chapter II
  • General provisions on profiling and automated decision-making – Chapter III
  • Specific provisions on solely automated decision-making defined in Article 22 - Chapter IV
  • Children and profiling – Chapter V
  • Data protection impact assessments and data protection officers– Chapter VI

The Annexes provide best practice recommendations, building on the experience gained in EU Member States.

The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29) will monitor the implementation of these guidelines and may complement them with further details as appropriate.

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Summary

European Union

European Union

CJEU caselaw

C-131/12 (13 May 2014) - Google Spain et Google

1.      Article 2(b) and (d) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data are to be interpreted as meaning that, first, the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of preference must be classified as ‘processing of personal data’ within the meaning of Article 2(b) when that information contains personal data and, second, the operator of the search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect of that processing, within the meaning of Article 2(d).

2.      Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that processing of personal data is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of a Member State, within the meaning of that provision, when the operator of a search engine sets up in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell advertising space offered by that engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member State.

3.      Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to comply with the rights laid down in those provisions and in so far as the conditions laid down by those provisions are in fact satisfied, the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to that person, also in a case where that name or information is not erased beforehand or simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as the case may be, when its publication in itself on those pages is lawful.

4.      Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, when appraising the conditions for the application of those provisions, it should inter alia be examined whether the data subject has a right that the information in question relating to him personally should, at this point in time, no longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of his name, without it being necessary in order to find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in that list causes prejudice to the data subject. As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.

Opinion of Advocate general

Judgment of the Court

C-398/15 (9 March 2017) - Manni

Article 6(1)(e), Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, read in conjunction with Article 3 of the First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community, as amended by Directive 2003/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003, must be interpreted as meaning that, as EU law currently stands, it is for the Member States to determine whether the natural persons referred to in Article 2(1)(d) and (j) of that directive may apply to the authority responsible for keeping, respectively, the central register, commercial register or companies register to determine, on the basis of a case-by-case assessment, if it is exceptionally justified, on compelling legitimate grounds relating to their particular situation, to limit, on the expiry of a sufficiently long period after the dissolution of the company concerned, access to personal data relating to them, entered in that register, to third parties who can demonstrate a specific interest in consulting that data.

Opinion of Advocate general

Judgment of the Court

C‑507/17 (24 september 2019) - Google (Portée territoriale du déréférencement)

On a proper construction of Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and of Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46 (General Data Protection Regulation), where a search engine operator grants a request for de-referencing pursuant to those provisions, that operator is not required to carry out that de-referencing on all versions of its search engine, but on the versions of that search engine corresponding to all the Member States, using, where necessary, measures which, while meeting the legal requirements, effectively prevent or, at the very least, seriously discourage an internet user conducting a search from one of the Member States on the basis of a data subject’s name from gaining access, via the list of results displayed following that search, to the links which are the subject of that request.

Opinion of Advocate general

Judgment of the Court

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Regulation
1e 2e

Art. 21

1.   The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), including profiling based on those provisions. The controller shall no longer process the personal data unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.

2.   Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the data subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her for such marketing, which includes profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing.

3.   Where the data subject objects to processing for direct marketing purposes, the personal data shall no longer be processed for such purposes.

4.   At the latest at the time of the first communication with the data subject, the right referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be explicitly brought to the attention of the data subject and shall be presented clearly and separately from any other information.

5.   In the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, the data subject may exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications.

6.   Where personal data are processed for scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes pursuant to Article 89(1), the data subject, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, shall have the right to object to processing of personal data concerning him or her, unless the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for reasons of public interest.
1st proposal close

Art. 19

1.           The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to their particular situation, at any time to the processing of personal data which is based on points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 6(1), unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.

2.           Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the data subject shall have the right to object free of charge to the processing of their personal data for such marketing. This right shall be explicitly offered to the data subject in an intelligible manner and shall be clearly distinguishable from other information.

3.           Where an objection is upheld pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, the controller shall no longer use or otherwise process the personal data concerned.
2nd proposal close

Art. 19

1. The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any time to the processing of personal data concerning him or her which is based on points (...) (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), the first sentence of Article 6(4) in conjunction with point (e) of Article 6(1) or the second sentence of Article 6(4).

The controller shall no longer process the personal data (...) unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, (...) rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.

1a. (...)

2. Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the data subject shall have the right to object (...) at any time to the processing of personal data concerning him or her for such marketing. At the latest at the time of the first communication with the data subject, this right shall be explicitly brought to the attention of the data subject (...) and shall be presented clearly and separately from any other information.

2a. Where the data subject objects to the processing for direct marketing purposes, the personal data shall no longer be processed for such purposes.

2aa. Where personal data are processed for historical, statistical or scientific purposes the data subject, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, shall have the right to object to processing of personal data concerning him or her, unless the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for reasons of public interest.

3. (...)

4. (...)
Directive close

Art. 14

Member States shall grant the data subject the right:

(a) at least in the cases referred to in Article 7 (e) and (f), to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data;

(b) to object, on request and free of charge, to the processing of personal data relating to him which the controller anticipates being processed for the purposes of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal data are disclosed for the first time to third parties or used on their behalf for the purposes of direct marketing, and to be expressly offered the right to object free of charge to such disclosures or uses.

Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that data subjects are aware of the existence of the right referred to in the first subparagraph of (b).
Switzerland
compare_arrows

DSG Art. 15 Rechtsansprüche
1 Klagen zum Schutz der Persönlichkeit richten sich nach den Artikeln 28, 28a sowie
28l des Zivilgesetzbuchs22. Die klagende Partei kann insbesondere verlangen, dass
die Datenbearbeitung gesperrt wird, keine Daten an Dritte bekannt gegeben oder die
Personendaten berichtigt oder vernichtet werden.
2 Kann weder die Richtigkeit noch die Unrichtigkeit von Personendaten dargetan
werden, so kann die klagende Partei verlangen, dass bei den Daten ein entsprechender
Vermerk angebracht wird.
3 Die klagende Partei kann zudem verlangen, dass die Berichtigung, die Vernichtung,
die Sperre, namentlich die Sperre der Bekanntgabe an Dritte, der Vermerk über die
Bestreitung oder das Urteil Dritten mitgeteilt oder veröffentlicht wird.
4 Über Klagen zur Durchsetzung des Auskunftsrechts entscheidet das Gericht im
vereinfachten Verfahren nach der Zivilprozessordnung vom 19. Dezember 2008.

DSG Art. 25 Ansprüche und Verfahren
1 Wer ein schutzwürdiges Interesse hat, kann vom verantwortlichen Bundesorgan
verlangen, dass es:
a. das widerrechtliche Bearbeiten von Personendaten unterlässt;
b. die Folgen eines widerrechtlichen Bearbeitens beseitigt;
c. die Widerrechtlichkeit des Bearbeitens feststellt.
2 Kann weder die Richtigkeit noch die Unrichtigkeit von Personendaten bewiesen
werden, so muss das Bundesorgan bei den Daten einen entsprechenden Vermerk
anbringen.
3 Der Gesuchsteller kann insbesondere verlangen, dass das Bundesorgan:
a. Personendaten berichtigt, vernichtet oder die Bekanntgabe an Dritte sperrt;
b. seinen Entscheid, namentlich die Berichtigung, Vernichtung, Sperre oder den
Vermerk über die Bestreitung Dritten mitteilt oder veröffentlicht.
4 Das Verfahren richtet sich nach dem Bundesgesetz vom 20. Dezember 1968 über
das Verwaltungsverfahren (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz). Die Ausnahmen von
Artikel 2 und 3 des Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetzes gelten nicht.

Art. 25bis  Verfahren im Falle der Bekanntgabe von amtlichen
Dokumenten, die Personendaten enthalten
Solange ein Verfahren betreffend den Zugang zu amtlichen Dokumenten im Sinne
des Öffentlichkeitsgesetzes vom 17. Dezember 200446, welche Personendaten enthalten,
im Gange ist, kann die betroffene Person im Rahmen dieses Verfahrens die
Rechte geltend machen, die ihr aufgrund von Artikel 25 des vorliegenden Gesetzes
bezogen auf diejenigen Dokumente zustehen, die Gegenstand des Zugangsverfahrens
sind.
United Kingdom close

10. Right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress

(1) Subject to subsection (2), an individual is entitled at any time by notice in writing to a data controller to require the data controller at the end of such period as is reasonable in the circumstances to cease, or not to begin, processing, or processing for a specified purpose or in a specified manner, any personal data in respect of which he is the data subject, on the ground that, for specified reasons—

(a) the processing of those data or their processing for that purpose or in that manner is causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to him or to another, and

(b) that damage or distress is or would be unwarranted.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply—

(a) in a case where any of the conditions in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Schedule 2 is met,

(b) in such other cases as may be prescribed by the [F1 Secretary of State] by order.

(3) The data controller must within twenty-one days of receiving a notice under subsection (1) (“the data subject notice”) give the individual who gave it a written notice—

(a) stating that he has complied or intends to comply with the data subject notice, or

(b) stating his reasons for regarding the data subject notice as to any extent unjustified and the extent (if any) to which he has complied or intends to comply with it.

(4) If a court is satisfied, on the application of any person who has given a notice under subsection (1) which appears to the court to be justified (or to be justified to any extent), that the data controller in question has failed to comply with the notice, the court may order him to take such steps for complying with the notice (or for complying with it to that extent) as the court thinks fit.

(5) The failure by a data subject to exercise the right conferred by subsection (1) or section 11(1) does not affect any other right conferred on him by this Part.

11. Right to prevent processing for purposes of direct marketing

(1) An individual is entitled at any time by notice in writing to a data controller to require the data controller at the end of such period as is reasonable in the circumstances to cease, or not to begin, processing for the purposes of direct marketing personal data in respect of which he is the data subject.

(2) If the court is satisfied, on the application of any person who has given a notice under subsection (1), that the data controller has failed to comply with the notice, the court may order him to take such steps for complying with the notice as the court thinks fit.

[F1(2A)This section shall not apply in relation to the processing of such data as are mentioned in paragraph (1) of regulation 8 of the Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) Regulations 1999 (processing of telecommunications billing data for certain marketing purposes) for the purposes mentioned in paragraph (2) of that regulation.]

(3) In this section “direct marketing” means the communication (by whatever means) of any advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals.
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