GDPR

The first territorial application criterion is maintained in article 3 of the Regulation: as such the Regulation is applicable to the processing performed in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller in the territory of the Union but it is also - and this is new - that of the processor. This clarification will prevent any discussion on the law applicable to it. The final version clarifies that this criterion is assessed, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.

The controller is defined in Article 4, 7) of the Regulation as: “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. Where the purposes and means of processing are determined by the law of the Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law”. Of course here, the criterion aims at determining the application of the Regulation itself and in addition to a national law of a Member State as in the Directive.

On the other hand by the definition of "main establishment" (see Art. 4, 16), the Regulation seeks a solution to locate in the Union the establishment to consider, whether it's a controller or a processor. The usefulness of these definitions is in identifying the competent supervising authority, that's why we refer to the commentary to Article 56.

The Regulation introduces also a new rule of extraterritorial application of European law to prevent it from being bypassed by a controller or a processor whose activities or establishment would be located outside the territory of the EU.

So, the Regulation would be applicable from the moment where:

- the processing activities are related to the supply of goods or services to natural persons on the territory of the Union, whether a payment of the data subject is required or not. This clarification means that the controller may not object to the free use of the goods or services to escape from the application of the Regulation.

To determine if this criterion is met, it should be considered whether the controller is planning to do business with persons residing in the Union. Recital 23 also specifies that the simple accessibility of the Internet site of the controller or of an intermediary in the Union is not sufficient to establish the intention of the controller to provide goods or services to persons located in the territory of the Union. The following factors should be therefore taken into account: the use of a language or a currency usually used in the Union; the possibility to order goods and services in that other language; the mention of clients or users residing in the Union (see recital 20).

-the processing activities are related to the observation of human behaviour, as long as these behaviours are involved within the Union. According to recital 24, in order to determine if a processing activity may be regarded as "observation" of the behaviour of the data subjects, it is necessary to establish whether these people are traced on the Internet using any data processing techniques to analyze the profile of an individual, in order to take any decisions with respect to them or analyze or predict his or her preferences, his or her behaviour and mindset.

Finally, the Regulation maintains its extraterritorial application in cases where a rule of public international law of the place of establishment of the controller lead to the application of the national law of a Member State. As specified in recital 25, this hypothesis includes the diplomatic missions and the consular posts of a Member State.

Direktivet

The EU legislature had planned a particularly broad territorial scope in order to ensure that no person will be excluded from the protection guaranteed by the Regulation and that this protection will not be bypassed (see G29, comment 08/2010 of 16 December 2010 on the applicable law).

The main criterion for application of European data protection law depended on the location of the controller in the territory of the Union in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller.  This criterion implies the demonstration of two elements:

• on the one hand, the controller must have an establishment in the territory of a Member State which involves exercising effective and real activity through a stable installation, regardless of the legal form of the business and regardless of the legal form of establishment (e.g., a branch or a subsidiary with legal personality). The Court of Justice of the Union calls for a flexible design of the concept of establishment which rules out any formalistic approach whereby an enterprise would be established in the place where it is registered only (see CJEU, 1 October 2015, C-230/14, p. 29);

 

• On the other hand, the processing must be carried out as part of the activities of this establishment in the territory of a Member State. The Court of justice of the Union specifies that in view of the objective of the Directive to ensure effective protection of the freedoms and rights of individuals, the expression "as part of the activities of an establishment' must not be given a restrictive interpretation. According to the Court of justice of the Union, the personal data processing should not be effected "by" the concerned establishment itself, but only "within its activities" (CJEU, judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C-131/12, point 53).

The Directive also contained two criteria of extraterritorial application of European law when the controller had no establishment in the territory of the Union. In the absence of establishment in the EU, the Directive remained applicable:

- When the controller resorted, for processing purposes, to means  that were located on the territory of the Union, unless these means were used only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Union. The notion of means of processing unfortunately was not subject to any legal definition, it gave rise to extensive jurisprudential and doctrinal debates. For example, the Group Article 29 believes that cookies or javascript barriers are processing means; according to CNIL, the use of  Google cars  on French territory constitutes processing means (CNIL, Deliberation No. 2011-035 of 17 March 2011)). In this case, the controller must designate a representative established on the territory of that Member State.

-When the national law of the controller was applied, under the international public law. This hypothesis includes in particular the embassies, which must comply with European law, despite the absence of an establishment in the Union.

Utfordringer

The extraterritorial application of the Regulation was inevitable in view of the evolution of technology and the omnipotence of some established companies outside the Union, offering goods and services on the Internet and therefore, if appropriate, to a community present on the European territory, the data of which are collected on the occasion of the offer and can then be processed outside the EU. The Court of Justice had already admitted the principle while having to quarter the criterion of connection to the permanent establishment.

This extraterritorial application leads to the difficult issue of the implementation of the decisions that would be obtained against a controller located outside the Union, perhaps in addition to the closure of access to its site when technically possible.

However, the Regulation does not give a criterion of connection of the multiple national laws to be taken under the Regulation (for example to implement an exception to one or the other principle of protection). Should we revert to the old criterion or each Member State will be free to apply its own international law to determine it, which may only pose difficulties?

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Art. 29-arbeidsgruppen

Guidelines for identifying a controller or processor’s lead supervisory authority (5 April 2017)

(Endorsed by the EDPB)

Identifying a lead supervisory authority is only relevant where a controller or processor is carrying out the cross-border processing of personal data. Article 4(23) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) defines ‘cross-border processing’ as either the:

- processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of establishments in more than one Member State of a controller or processor in the Union where the controller or processor is established in more than one Member State; or the

- processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of a single establishment of a controller or processor in the Union but which substantially affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in more than one Member State.

This means that where an organisation has establishments in France and Romania, for example, and the processing of personal data takes place in the context of their activities, then this will constitute cross-border processing.

Alternatively, the organisation may only carry out processing activity in the context of its establishment in France. However, if the activity substantially affects – or is likely to substantially affect - data subjects in France and Romania then this will also constitute crossborder processing.

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European Union

EU-domstolens praksis

C-131/12 (13 May 2014)

1.      Article 2(b) and (d) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data are to be interpreted as meaning that, first, the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of preference must be classified as ‘processing of personal data’ within the meaning of Article 2(b) when that information contains personal data and, second, the operator of the search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect of that processing, within the meaning of Article 2(d).

2.      Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that processing of personal data is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of a Member State, within the meaning of that provision, when the operator of a search engine sets up in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell advertising space offered by that engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member State.

3.      Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to comply with the rights laid down in those provisions and in so far as the conditions laid down by those provisions are in fact satisfied, the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to that person, also in a case where that name or information is not erased beforehand or simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as the case may be, when its publication in itself on those pages is lawful.

4.      Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, when appraising the conditions for the application of those provisions, it should inter alia be examined whether the data subject has a right that the information in question relating to him personally should, at this point in time, no longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of his name, without it being necessary in order to find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in that list causes prejudice to the data subject. As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.

Opinion of Advocate general

Judgment of the Court

C-230/14 (1 October 2015)

1.      Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as permitting the application of the law on the protection of personal data of a Member State other than the Member State in which the controller with respect to the processing of those data is registered, in so far as that controller exercises, through stable arrangements in the territory of that Member State, a real and effective activity — even a minimal one — in the context of which that processing is carried out.

In order to ascertain, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, whether that is the case, the referring court may, in particular, take account of the fact (i) that the activity of the controller in respect of that processing, in the context of which that processing takes place, consists of the running of property dealing websites concerning properties situated in the territory of that Member State and written in that Member State’s language and that it is, as a consequence, mainly or entirely directed at that Member State, and (ii) that that controller has a representative in that Member State, who is responsible for recovering the debts resulting from that activity and for representing the controller in the administrative and judicial proceedings relating to the processing of the data concerned.

By contrast, the issue of the nationality of the persons concerned by such data processing is irrelevant.

2.      Where the supervisory authority of a Member State, to which complaints have been submitted in accordance with Article 28(4) of Directive 95/46, reaches the conclusion that the law applicable to the processing of the personal data concerned is not the law of that Member State, but the law of another Member State, Article 28(1), (3) and (6) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that that supervisory authority will be able to exercise the effective powers of intervention conferred on it in accordance with Article 28(3) of that directive only within the territory of its own Member State. Accordingly, it cannot impose penalties on the basis of the law of that Member State on the controller with respect to the processing of those data who is not established in that territory, but should, in accordance with Article 28(6) of that directive, request the supervisory authority within the Member State whose law is applicable to act.

3.      Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘adatfeldolgozás’ (technical manipulation of data), used in the Hungarian version of that directive, in particular in Articles 4(1)(a) and 28(6) thereof, must be understood as having the same meaning as that of the term ‘adatkezelés’ (data processing).

Opinion of Advocate general

Judgment of the Court

C-191/15 (28 July 2016)

1.      Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) and Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) must be interpreted as meaning that, without prejudice to Article 1(3) of each of those regulations, the law applicable to an action for an injunction within the meaning of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests directed against the use of allegedly unfair contractual terms by an undertaking established in a Member State which concludes contracts in the course of electronic commerce with consumers resident in other Member States, in particular in the State of the court seised, must be determined in accordance with Article 6(1) of Regulation No 864/2007, whereas the law applicable to the assessment of a particular contractual term must always be determined pursuant to Regulation No 593/2008, whether that assessment is made in an individual action or in a collective action.

2.      Article 3(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a term in the general terms and conditions of a seller or supplier which has not been individually negotiated, under which the contract concluded with a consumer in the course of electronic commerce is to be governed by the law of the Member State in which the seller or supplier is established, is unfair in so far as it leads the consumer into error by giving him the impression that only the law of that Member State applies to the contract, without informing him that under Article 6(2) of Regulation No 593/2008 he also enjoys the protection of the mandatory provisions of the law that would be applicable in the absence of that term, this being for the national court to ascertain in the light of all the relevant circumstances.

3.      Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the processing of personal data carried out by an undertaking engaged in electronic commerce is governed by the law of the Member State to which that undertaking directs its activities, if it is shown that the undertaking carries out the data processing in question in the context of the activities of an establishment situated in that Member State. It is for the national court to ascertain whether that is the case.

Opinion of Advocate general 

Judgment of the Court 

C- 210/16 (5 June 2018)

1. Articles 4 and 28 of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, where an undertaking established outside the European Union has several establishments in different Member States, the supervisory authority of a Member State is entitled to exercise the powers conferred on it by Article 28(3) of that directive with respect to an establishment of that undertaking situated in the territory of that Member State even if, as a result of the division of tasks within the group, first, that establishment is responsible solely for the sale of advertising space and other marketing activities in the territory of that Member State and, second, exclusive responsibility for collecting and processing personal data belongs, for the entire territory of the European Union, to an establishment situated in another Member State.

2 . Article 4(1)(a) and Article 28(3) and (6) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, where the supervisory authority of a Member State intends to exercise with respect to an entity established in the territory of that Member State the powers of intervention referred to in Article 28(3) of that directive, on the ground of infringements of the rules on the protection of personal data committed by a third party responsible for the processing of that data whose seat is in another Member State, that supervisory authority is competent to assess, independently of the supervisory authority of the other Member State, the lawfulness of such data processing and may exercise its powers of intervention with respect to the entity established in its territory without first calling on the supervisory authority of the other Member State to intervene.

Opinion of advocate general

Judgment of the court

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