The GDPR
The Regulation goes further than the Directive: it is not at the discretion of Member States to set up a procedure for appeals, but a absolute right granted to any physical person or legal entity to appeal against a legally binding decision of the supervisory authority concerned. The right to a judicial remedy against a decision by a supervisory authority is an essential element of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.
This right to a an effective judicial remedy arises where the supervisory authority does not handle a complaint or does not inform the data subject within three months or a shorter period as prescribed by the applicable national law, on the progress or outcome of the complaint lodged (paragraph 2).
As a principle, the data subject must lodge a complaint in the jurisdiction of the Member State where the supervisory authority is established (paragraph 3).
Finally, the European text obliges the supervisory authority to communicate to the relevant jurisdiction a complaint against one of its decisions, the notice or the decision of the European Data Protection Board, which would have been made previously under the consistency mechanism (paragraph 4).
The Directive
We have seen (see the comments on Article 77) that pursuant to the Directive, the Member States should implement a procedure whereby any citizen, or an association that represents that citizen can lodge a complaint with the competent control authority, especially to check the lawfulness of a relevant processing.
The Directive further provided that decisions by the supervisory authorities which give rise to complaints may be appealed through the courts.
Potential issues
The evolution is significant. Several States did not allow an appeal against the decisions of the supervisory authorities, often due to their lack of binding powers. The states should therefore insert this remedy in their domestic law, according to their specific procedures (administrative, judicial courts, etc.).
For instance, under Belgian law, the implementation of this new right to an effective judicial remedy will necessarily involve the implementation of a new procedure.
We wouldn't be surprised that, as in other areas (right to competition, right to energy, etc.), the remedy is entrusted to a specialized chamber within a Member State.
European Union
CJEU caselaw
C‑132/21 (12 January 2023), Budapesti Elektromos Művek
Article 77(1), Article 78(1) and Article 79(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
must be interpreted as permitting the remedies provided for in Article 77(1) and Article 78(1) of that regulation, on the one hand, and Article 79(1) thereof, on the other, to be exercised concurrently with and independently of each other. It is for the Member States, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to lay down detailed rules as regards the relationship between those remedies in order to ensure the effective protection of the rights guaranteed by that regulation and the consistent and homogeneous application of its provisions, as well as the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal as referred to in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Decision of the court
Opinion of the advocate General
C‑26/22 et C‑64/22, UF (C‑26/22), AB (C‑64/22) v. Land Hessen (7 December 2023)
1. Article 78(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)
must be interpreted as meaning that a decision on a complaint adopted by a supervisory authority is subject to full judicial review.
2. Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2016/679, read in conjunction with point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of that regulation,
must be interpreted as precluding a practice of private credit information agencies consisting in retaining, in their own databases, information from a public register relating to the grant of a discharge from remaining debts in favour of natural persons in order to be able to provide information on the solvency of those persons, for a period extending beyond that during which the data are kept in the public register.
3. Article 17(1)(c) of Regulation 2016/679
must be interpreted as meaning that the data subject has the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay where he or she objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) of that regulation and there are no overriding legitimate grounds capable of justifying, exceptionally, the processing in question.
4. Article 17(1)(d) of Regulation 2016/679
must be interpreted as meaning that the controller is required to erase unlawfully processed personal data as soon as possible.
Decision of the court
Opinion of the advocate general
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